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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a small claims action originating in the Ogden City 
Justice Court and heard de novo in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County. Appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to reviewing rulings on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Utah Code Ann. §78A-8-106(2) (West 
2009). This Court has jurisdiction over this case by virtue of the fact that the case 
has been transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (West 2009). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue #1: Whether a requirement that a fee be paid in order to obtain a 
hearing challenging a notice that a person has violated municipal property 
maintenance standards and is subject to a potential civil penalty violates the 
constitutional rights of an accused person to not be compelled to advance a fee 
prior to final judgment under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Standard of Review: This is a constitutional issue that is reviewed for 
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f25, 100 P.3d 1177, 1185. 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by oral motion and ruled on 
by the trial court during the trial. Trial Transcript, pp. 64-66; 71-72. 
Issue #2: Whether the assessment of civil fines by a municipality for the 
violation of municipal property maintenance standards is in direct conflict with 
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code, which outlines the procedure by which 
cities may recover costs they incur in the abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and 
deleterious objects or structures on private property. 
Standard of Review: This is a constitutional issue that is reviewed for 
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, |25, 100 P.3d 1177, 1185, see also Salt 
2 
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Lake City v. Newman, 2006 UT 69, \ 10, 148 P.3d 931 (ordinance which impliedly 
conflicts with state statute not unconstitutional). 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by oral motion and ruled on 
by the trial court during the trial. Trial Transcript, pp. 44-46; 49-51; 67-69. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 3, Section 703: 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum 
criminal penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to 
exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or 
by a term of imprisonment up to six months, or by both the fine and term of 
imprisonment. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may 
prescribe a minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal 
ordinance by a fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine 
under Section 76-3-301. 
(b) A municipality may not impose a civil penalty and adjudication for 
the violation of a municipal moving traffic ordinance. 
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 60: 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose 
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 84: 
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect 
or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are 
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, 
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of 
property in the city. 
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the 
ordinances with fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703. 
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 11: Reproduced in the addendum to Decker's brief. 
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 1, Chapter 4A: Reproduced in the addendum. 
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 1, Chapter 4B: Reproduced in the addendum. 
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 12, Chapter 4: Reproduced in the addendum. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ogden City accepts the statement of the case as contained in Decker's brief 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues raised on appeal: 
1. At all times relevant to this appeal, Weston Decker was the owner, agent or 
occupant (responsible person) of real property located at 2026 Madison 
Avenue, in Ogden City. Trial Transcript, pp. 3-6.l 
2. At all times relevant to this appeal, Ogden City had in effect an ordinance 
governing property maintenance for all property within the city. Trial 
Transcript, p. 3; see also Ogden City Municipal Code § 12-4-1, et. seq., 
contained in Addendum. 
3. The ordinance enables the city to require a responsible person to correct 
conditions violating the property maintenance regulations on property that 
was in violation of the ordinance and to assess penalties against or seek 
remedies from the responsible person. Trial Transcript, p. 43; Ogden City 
Municipal Code § 12-4-8, contained in Addendum. 
4. Although the property maintenance standards allow for civil penalties to 
accrue daily, it is the practice of Ogden City to re-inspect each property 
1
 The trial transcript is found in the record on appeal as item number 62. 
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about every 15 days and assess additional penalties only when the property 
is still in violation of the standards. Trial Transcript, p. 19. 
5. On October 31, 2006, Mr. Decker was issued a warning letter from Ogden 
City that the Madison Avenue property was in violation of the property 
maintenance regulations and directing him to comply with the city 
ordinance. Trial Transcript, pp. 3-4; Plaintiffs Exhibit 11. 
6. The notice of violation informed Mr. Decker of the need to cure the 
violation, the potential penalties for failure to correct the violations, and of 
his right to request a hearing if he disagreed with the finding of a violation. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 11. 
7. The required filing fee for a hearing is $25.00. Trial Transcript p. 33; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 11. 
8. An inspection of the Madison property on November 16, 2006, showed that 
the property had not been cleaned up and a civil citation and a fine of $125 
was assessed against Mr. Decker. Trial Transcript pp. 8-9; Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1. 
2
 The trial exhibits are found in the record on appeal as item number 63. 
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9. The Madison property was inspected on December 4, 2006, and due to the 
continuing violation a civil fine was assessed in the amount of $250.00. Trial 
Transcript pp. 12-13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. 
10. The Madison property was inspected on December 21, 2006, and due to the 
continuing violation a civil fine was assessed in the amount of $500.00. Trial 
Transcript pp. 13-14; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
11. Additional inspections of the Madison property from January 2007, through 
September 2007 disclosed continuing violations and six additional citations 
were issued, each with a fine in the amount of $500.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
12. The total amount of all civil fines for the Madison Avenue property was 
$3,875.00. Trial Transcript, p. 39. 
13. Each citation included, on the reverse side, a notice that an administrative 
hearing was available upon request and payment of a $25 non-refundable 
filing fee. Trial Transcript, pp. 17-18, 26; Plaintiffs Exhibit 14. 
14. At some point in the process of receiving the notice of violation and the 
assessment of civil fines, Mr. Decker inquired about a possible hearing, but 
refused to pay the filing fee. As a result no hearing was held. Trial 
Transcript, p. 33. 
7 
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< 
15. At no time did Ogden City choose to use city funds to abate the property 
i 
maintenance violations at the Madison Avenue property. Trial Transcript, p. 
40. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The rights contained in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution include , 
a number of procedures which serve to protect the due process rights of a person in 
a criminal prosecution who is accused of violating the law. Among these rights is 
the guarantee that no accused person need advance fees to secure any of those due 
process procedures prior to a final judgment. There is no basis in the Utah 
Constitution to extend the right to not pay a fee to a civil proceeding where a 
person has not been criminally charged. If the Court addresses the broader issue of 
due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, an argument that 
was not directly ruled on at trial, then it will see that Ogden City's requirement that 
a small fee be paid prior to holding a hearing on a property maintenance violation 
does not violate any constitutional right and adequately meets the flexible nature of 
due process as applied to that type of proceeding. This is particularly the case here, 
where Mr. Decker did not provide any evidence that he was unable to pay the 
required fee and has chosen to mount a facial attack against the fee. 
8 
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Utah municipalities are given broad power to address nuisances within their 
boundaries. They are specifically authorized to impose civil fines against persons 
who do not comply with ordinances describing property maintenance procedures. 
In addition, the legislature has recognized that there are times when a city may 
elect to expend public funds to abate a nuisance condition on private property 
when the responsible person has failed to take necessary steps to address the 
problem. The legislature has created a process that a city may follow to collect 
those costs through the county tax and assessment rolls. In order to take advantage 
of this method of collection, a city must follow specific procedures outlined in 
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code. This statutory method of collecting costs 
does not, however, limit the ability of a city to elect not to abate a nuisance and 
choose, instead, to assess civil penalties against the person responsible for the 
property. To hold otherwise would severely handicap cities ability to adequately 
address the issue of neglected property. Due to the absence of any direct conflict 
between the assessment of a civil fine and the choice not to expend city funds to 
perform abatement on private property, the use by Ogden City of civil fines to 
encourage compliance with its property maintenance standards does not violate the 
Utah Constitution. 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
\ 
Owners and occupants of real property in Ogden City are expected to 
maintain the exterior areas of their property free of junk and debris in compliance 
1 
with local ordinances. Ogden Municipal Code § 12-4-1. When an inspection 
officer observes conditions that violate the standards adopted by ordinance, a 
notice of violation is prepared and the responsible party is given time to bring the 
property into compliance with the ordinance. Ogden Municipal Code § 1-4B-3. If 
the responsible party fails to act, the inspector may send additional notices and { 
assess civil penalties or fines. These fines may be assessed on a daily basis and 
increase in amount up to a maximum of $500 per day. Ogden Municipal Code §§ 
1-4B-4, 1-4B-5, 12-4-8. 
Responsible parties who receive an initial or subsequent notice have several 
options. They may clean up the property and avoid future penalties, they may 
negotiate with the inspector for additional time, they may file an administrative 
appeal which requires payment of a $25 fee, or they may sit back and do nothing. 
Regardless of which option they choose, there is no self executing action through 
which the city may collect any penalty or fine. The failure to act might result in 
criminal charges being brought through the filing and service of an information; it 
might result in a collection action being filed to collect the assessed but unpaid 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
penalties; and it might result in the city taking action to abate the violations and 
collect the costs incurred as provided by statute. 
I. The Provision in the Ogden City Municipal Code Requiring Payment of an 
Appeal Fee by Persons Who Have Been Given a Warning or Civil Citation 
for Failure to Maintain the Exterior of their Property Does Not Violate Due 
Process. 
While it is true that Ogden City requires payment of a fee by persons given a 
warning or citation and who are responsible for the care of property to appeal the 
issue of whether the property is in violation of the city's property maintenance 
laws, there is no evidence in this case that any of Decker's constitutional rights 
were violated by this requirement. First, because this is not a criminal case, Decker 
was not deprived of rights otherwise available to accused persons in a criminal 
prosecution. Second, general due process considerations do not require a free 
hearing in every case. Finally, the total amount of civil penalties recognized by the 
trial court was not excessive. 
A. Decker Has Not Been Subject to Criminal Prosecution in this Case. 
Decker argues that Article I, Section 7 and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, when read together, entitle him to an administrative hearing without 
having to pay a hearing fee. The use of Article I, Section 12 to make this argument 
11 
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is an inappropriate expansion of that section. Although it is true that Article I, 
Section 12, includes a long list of rights that provide due process of law to an 
accused person in a criminal prosecution, it does not stand for the proposition put 
forth by Decker, that it "prevents the government from requiring the payment of 1 
any fee as a pre-condition to secure any of the rights guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution." Decker Brief, pp 8-9. Instead, when Article I, Section 12 guarantees 
that" [i]n no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed," the rights it is 
referring to are the rights specifically described in that section. Decker has 
provided no case law or historic evidence that the restriction on payment of fees 
was ever intended to be applied outside of the criminal context. Although the city 
can, and sometimes does, file criminal charges when a person refuses to comply 
with property maintenance ordinances, the judgment awarded in this case was not ' 
the result of a criminal prosecution. 
There is no doubt that if an information is filed, the accused is entitled to all 
of the protections of the constitutions of Utah and the United States. Had the city 
chosen to file criminal charges against Decker for violating the city's property 
maintenance code, he would have received a hearing on the charges without cost 
prior to final judgment. But there were no criminal charges in this case, no 
information, and no possibility that Decker would face jail time for ignoring the 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
requirements of the law over a long period of time. Decker attributes the city's 
choice of action to "a governmental practice [that] has arisen to 'accuse' citizens of 
wrongdoing, but in a manner carefully crafted to avoid the 'constitutional rights' 
guaranteed to the citizens by the Utah Constitution." Decker Brief, p. 19 (quotation 
marks in original). The fact that a city utilizes a civil process to assess fines for 
violations of its ordinances does not mean that it has denied anyone's 
constitutional rights - it simply means that the city finds the use of civil penalties 
to be a better option than enforcing every violation through the filing of 
misdemeanor charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (West 2004) (cities may 
impose either civil fines or criminal penalties for violations of local ordinance). 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support A Claim That Decker Was Denied 
Due Process 
Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the Utah Constitution does not directly 
apply to his case, Decker argues that "the interplay between Section 7 ["due 
process"] and Section 12 ["the rights herein guaranteed"] is clear, by reference to 
3
 In footnote 1 at page 20 of his brief, Decker raises a question about why he was 
expected to pay a civil fine when there had been no conviction or sentencing. This 
allegation is based on the provisions of title 1, chapter 4 A of the Ogden Municipal 
Code. While chapter 4 article A does allow for a judge to impose these penalties 
upon conviction in a criminal prosecution, it is chapter 4 article B of that title 
which describes the process for imposing civil penalties when there is no criminal 
proceeding. It is somewhat curious the Decker does not recognize the distinction 
since he quotes directly from article 4B on page 19 of his brief. 
13 
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the unambiguous text." Decker Brief, p. 16. Although it is clear that Article I, 
Section 12 describes certain due process protections for persons charged in 
criminal cases; there is no clear or unambiguous text that the general due process 
protections in Article I, Section 7, require incorporation of these criminal due 1 
process guarantees in non-criminal proceedings. Decker uses this supposed 
"interplay" to raise a facial due process argument against the city's appeal fee. The 
court should reject this argument because Decker did not raise it before the trial 
court and because hearing fee does not, on its face, rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. 
/. Decker did not raise an Article I, Section 7, Due Process claim at 
trial
 ( 
Decker waived the right to challenge the City's appeal fee based on the due 
process clause of the Utah Constitution by failing to raise the argument before the < 
trial court. 
It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. Moreover, the party must 
specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought "to a 'level of 
consciousness1 before the trial court. This requirement serves the interests of 
judicial economy and orderly procedure by not only giving the trial court a \ 
chance to correct error, but by making the parties crystallize issues prior to 
appeal. When issues are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely 
manner, they are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering 
their merits on appeal. 
14 
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Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281,288 (citations, 
quotations and alterations omitted). At trial, Decker's counsel argued that charging 
a fee for an administrative hearing violated article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. At no time did counsel directly refer to article I section 7, nor did he 
specifically address due process outside of the context of the article I section 12 
discussion. In order to fully present this concern, the relevant portions of the trial 
where due process may have been raised will be discussed. After the city presented 
its evidence, Decker's counsel made a motion to dismiss, and stated: 
MR. HOMER: ... You don't have to read very far in the Constitution to see 
that there are in the Constitution certain due process ideas. The bottom line 
is, I think the city's ordinance requiring Mr. Decker to pay that $25 fee and 
without paying the fee he has no rights to adjudicate that, that $25 fee 
violates that portion of the constitution where it says in all cases - let me see 
if I can find this. It's in the state constitution, Your Honor. In all cases or in 
no case - let's see, let me just read it here. "In no instance shall any accused 
person"-
THE COURT: Where are you reading? 
MR. HOMER: Section 12, halfway between 10 and 14. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOMER: In no[] instance - I'm about six lines down into the middle -
"In no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed." I submit 
that that applied to the Ogden City hearing request and when they deny him 
the right to have that hearing, they have then infringed upon a very valuable 
due process right and so if that hearing wasn't held because, even though he 
had asked for it, they didn't have it because he didn't pay the fee, I submit 
that totally undermines the city's claim for the $3900 because he asked for 
15 
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the hearing and the city didn't give it to him. So I raise that constitutional 
issue. 
There are some interrelationships between that idea under the Utah 
Constitution and maybe a more generalized due process right under the 
United States Constitution. 
Transcript, p. 65, line 5, through p. 66 line 7. The trial judge then asked the city if 
it "want[ed] to respond to the Article I, Section 12" issue. Id. at p. 66, lines 21-22. 
As the judge considered the issue, he addressed the context of Article I, j 
section 12 in light of language appearing earlier in that section. Id. p. 70 lines 11-
25 and p. 71, lines 1-15. The trial judge then found "for the purpose of the Motion < 
to Dismiss, that Article I, Section 12 is inapplicable in this setting because Mr. 
Decker has not been charged criminally in this setting ... I don't think that Article 
I, Section 12 is written with the civil setting in mind." Id. p. 71, lines 18-24. 
Decker's counsel subsequently discussed with the trial court the nature of the head 
note, or title, to Article I, Section 12, when he said: 
MR. HOMER: ... I understand your ruling your Honor. You're aware that 
these little head notes in the code section w[h]ere it says Sectionl2 and then 
brackets, rights of accused persons, that rights of accused persons is not 
phrasing in the Utah Constitution? You're aware of that? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether I was or not. I'm interested in 
what come[s] after the bracketed language. 
i 
Trial Transcript, p. 72, lines 18-25. The only additional argument from Decker's 
counsel that may have pertained to a due process concern was a statement that: "I 
have a little trouble with the somewhat cavalier style that the city is saying, Well, 
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you have these Constitutional rights but only if it's a criminal case." Id., p. 73, 
lines 11-14. Even if this comment was meant to broaden Decker's due process 
argument, it did not focus the trial court such an expanded claim and so, when the 
trial court summarized its ruling, it found as follows: 
Mr. Homer then advanced his Constitutional argument that under Article I, 
Section 12 that Mr. Decker was denied his constitutional right, his 
constitutional rights under Article I, Section 12 by being required to pay a 
non-refundable fee to appeal the decision of the city. Specifically Mr. Homer 
relies upon the language that says in no instance shall any accused person 
before final judgment be compelled to advance any money or fee to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed and as I previously indicated, I find that Article 
I, Section 12, deals with criminal prosecutions as it says it does, in criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall[,] and then it outlines all of the rights that 
pertain to the individual... And so I do not find that Article I. Section 12 has 
application in this case where this is a civil case. 
Id., p. 80, lines 15-20 and p. 81, lines 1-6. At no point was the trial court ever put 
on notice that Decker was making a due process claim under Article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution or under any line of case law dealing with due process other 
than in the context of Article I, Sectionl2. As a result, this Court should not allow 
Decker to broaden his constitutional claim on appeal to ask whether "collecting a 
fee in advance as a pre-condition for the exercise of those 'due process' rights" 
violates a property owner's right to due process of law. Decker Brief, p. 2. The 
issue addressed by the trial court, and which this Court could consider on appeal, is 
whether Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution prohibits Ogden City from 
requiring a property owner, or other responsible person, to pay a fee prior to 
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obtaining an administrative hearing which would address claims that the property 
is not in violation of the city's nuisance ordinance. Or, in other words, does the 
right guaranteed to an accused person as part of a criminal proceeding to not pay a 
fee prior to final judgment extend to individuals who are served with a notice of a 
potential civil penalty for failure to maintain property for which they are 
responsible. The reasons why this question should be answered in the negative 
have already been presented. 
ii. Decker does not have standing to challenge the fee. 
Decker did not provide any evidence at trial that he was incapable of paying 
the hearing fee. As a result, even if a due process claim was properly raised, 
Decker can only attack the hearing fee on its face, and not as applied in his specific 
case. Decker does not deny that he was provided with notice of the alleged 
violation. Nor does he claim that an administrative hearing was not made available 
to him where he could address the nature of the violation. His only claim is that the 
requirement to pay a fee in order to obtain the hearing is, in all circumstances, 
unconstitutional. 
Although the issue of whether due process concerns are implicated by a fee 
requirement is not frequently reported, the only time such a concern has been 
recognized is when a person has shown that the fee directly affected the ability to 
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obtain a hearing or receive proper treatment. In this context, the United States 
Supreme Court has said: 
Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process 
because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost requirement, 
valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a 
particular party's opportunity to be heard. 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S. Ct. 780, 787, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 
(1971) (emphasis added). In Boddie, a group of welfare recipients challenged a 
Connecticut requirement that court fees and costs of service be paid in order to 
obtain a divorce. Id. at 372. After they had requested a waiver of the fees and were 
denied, they claimed that the fee requirement was unconstitutional as it applied to 
their circumstances. Id. Although the Supreme Court agreed with their position, 
what is significant for this case is that it clarified its holding to make clear that the 
requirement of payment of a fee does not always rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation. "In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into 
court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than 
necessary to dispose of the case before us, a case where the bona fides of both 
appellants1 indigency and desire for divorce are here beyond dispute." Id. at 382. If 
due process always required a free hearing, the Supreme Court would not have 
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made specific reference to the circumstances of particular parties and the 
undisputed nature of their indigence. 
When Boddie has been applied in other circumstances, it has always been 
with a focus on the person specifically affected, and how the individual's inability 
to pay deprived the person of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Little 
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) (indigent defendant 
required to pay for blood test to challenge paternity denied due process). In this 
case, Decker provided no evidence that he was unable to pay the fee in order to 
obtain a hearing. The only evidence provided to the trial court was that he either 
failed or refused to make the payment. On cross examination of the city's code 
enforcement officer, Decker's attorney engaged in the following dialogue: 
Q. Going back to [exhibit] 14 then, Mr. Porter, paragraph 7, appeal process 
is available and then it says "In the event you believe" and that would be I 
guess the person to whom this is issued, "you have been issued this citation 
in error, you may appeal the imposition of the civil penalty by filing an 
application for hearing along with a $25 non-refundable filing fee." That's 
what that paragraph says, right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Decker attempt to file an application for hearing, do you know? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he pay the $25 filing fee? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He didn't. Did the city act on his application for hearing? 
A. By act, did we have the hearing? 
Q. Or decide not to have a hearing? I realize that's a dual question. 
A. No, the hearing was not scheduled because he did not pay the application 
fee. 
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Q. Okay. So the city's process is that it costs $25 if you want to challenge 
these accusations against Mr. Decker? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And all other similarly situated persons, right? Everybody who gets a 
citation, civil citation they have to pay the fee? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any process in the city's ordinance for waiving that $25 fee? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Trial Transcript, p. 33, line 3 through p. 34, line 8. There was no follow up with the 
officer as to what Decker's reasons may have been or whether Decker's failure to 
pay the fee had anything to do with an inability to pay. Furthermore, Decker did 
not put on any evidence of his own that would explain why he did not pay the fee. 
Instead, after the city presented its evidence and after Decker's motion to dismiss 
was denied, Decker chose not to present evidence. See Trial Transcript, p. 72, lines 
8-13. As a result, Decker's due process claim should be denied for lack of 
standing. 
This case bears a strong similarity to Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1980). In that case, two individuals challenged the constitutionality of a 
requirement that a fee be paid to appear on a ballot in an election. Id. at 241. The 
allegations of impecuniosity were not proven to the satisfaction of the trial court 
and were not presented to the appellate court. Id. at 242. In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: 
A constitutional question does not arise merely because it is raised and a 
decision sought thereon; rather, the constitutionality of a statue ought to be 
considered in the light of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the 
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question and of its particular application. An attack on the validity of a 
statue cannot be made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not 
about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute. 
Id. In this case, although it is undisputed that Decker did not pay the appeal fee and 
that he did not receive an administrative hearing, his failure to produce evidence 
that he was incapable of paying the fee does not establish that Decker was 
personally prejudiced by the requirement. Therefore, he is not in a position to 
challenge the constitutionality of the fee. See, e.g. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 
283 (Utah 1994) (defendant bears initial burden of establishing indigence),, As the 
Hoyle court reasoned, "[t]he far-reaching effect of a constitutional determination 
upon the rights of the general public negatives any consideration of a constitutional 
question presented by a friendly or fictitious suit or on admitted or agreed facts. 
Such questions area only to be reached after a full disclosure of all material facts." 
Hoyle, 606P.2d at 242-243. 
Hi. Even if Decker has standing, the fee does not violate his Due Process 
rights. 
In this case, Decker was assessed civil fines and, when he failed to pay the 
fines, the city obtained a small claims judgment against him. He appealed to the 
district court where the judgment was affirmed following a trial de novo. Utah 
Constitution Article I, Section 7, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." The guarantee of due process 
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does not contain an internal standard for determining when it has been violated. 
Furthermore, "[d]ue process ... is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. The requirements of due process 
depend upon the specific context in which they are applied." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, f25, 100 P.3d 1177,1185 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Because Decker has not provided the Court with a method of analyzing his 
due process claim under the state constitution, Ogden City will apply the three 
elements adopted by the United States Supreme Court for the federal due process 
clause as discussed in Streater. These elements are: "the private interests at stake, 
the risk the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value of 
the suggested procedural safeguard; and the governmental interests affected." 452 
U.S. at 13. See also, V-l Oil Co. v. Dep't ofEnvtl Quality, Div. of Solid & 
Hazardous Waste, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997)(applying similar test as 
described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 
L.Ed.2dl8(1976)). 
The private interest at stake in the context of the determination of a property 
maintenance violation and the assessment of a civil fine does not rise to the same 
level of significance as fundamental issues of freedom of movement or the ability 
to determine one's familial relations. A monetary, or economic, interest does not 
require the heightened types of protection that were at play in Boddie (the ability to 
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obtain a divorce) or Streater (the creation of a parent-child relationship). In the 
case of civil fines, the assessment of the fine itself does not deprive a responsible 
person of any property. Although the failure to address the violation may 
ultimately lead to a money judgment and subsequent collection, this type of private 
interest is not entitled to any heightened protection. 
The risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results is limited in 
this case. The responsible party is first given an opportunity to clean up the 
property before a civil fine is assessed, and the inspector is required to assess the 
fine against a person who is connected with the management of the property. As a 
result, it is unlikely that a fine would ever be assessed against a person who did not 
bear responsibility under the ordinance. The procedural safeguard, not requiring 
payment of a fee, may help an impecunious party, but given the fact that the fee is 
only $25.00, there are very few people to whom the fee would serve as a bar to the 
full exercise of their rights. And, as addressed above, there is no evidence in this 
case that Decker was unable to pay the fee. 
Finally, the governmental interest in collecting the fee is important. The fee 
helps offset a small portion of the costs associated with processing, scheduling and 
holding the hearing. By not charging a fee, the city would face the prospect of 
increased costs due to many more hearings being scheduled, while responsible 
parties are not required to make even a minimal commitment to the process. On 
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balance, the fee serves to make the hearing process widely available while 
imposing a minor cost on the responsible party. 
Decker does not argue that the notice of the violation was defective, that the 
potential penalties were not disclosed, that a hearing process was not available, or 
that the hearing process would be conducted before someone who was not 
impartial. His only complaint is that the need to pay a fee in order to receive the 
hearing deprived him of his property without due process of law. Based on the 
facts and circumstances associated with the city's property maintenance standards, 
the fee does not violate his due process rights. 
C. Decker's Claim that the Civil Penalty is an Excessive Fine Was Not 
Raised Before the District Court and Should Be Dismissed 
On pages 22 and 23 of his brief, Decker challenges the amount of the civil 
citations, both individually and cumulatively, as being unconstitutionally 
excessive. In so doing, Decker cites a line of cases discussing the difference 
between taxes and fees. In those cases where fees are collected, Utah courts have 
routinely held that the fee cannot be excessive when compared to the service 
provided. There are two primary reasons why this argument is unavailing to 
Decker's claims. 
First, the constitutional claim which Decker is attempting to make is not 
really a due process claim, but is more properly classified under the excessive fine 
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portion of the constitution. See Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 9. Nowhere in 
the transcript from the district court does it show that Decker raised the issue of the 
amount of the fine as a specific constitutional violation. In addition, there is no 
indication in the transcript that the trial court entered any findings or order 
addressing the constitutionality of the civil penalties. The only point at which 
Decker raised the issue of fines was in the context of his argument that title 10, 
chapter 11 of the Utah Code limits the ability of cities to do anything other than 
abate the violations when a responsible party refuses to do so. See Trial Transcript, 
p. 73, line 14 through p. 74, line 9. Whether the total amount of the fines was 
excessive cannot, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal. Holmstrom v. 
C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281, 288. 
Second, the dollar amount of a civil fine is expressly authorized by state law 
and need not correlate with any service rendered. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 
(West 2004) (civil fines allowed in amount not to exceed maximum class B 
misdemeanor fine). The whole point behind a civil fine is to deter individuals from 
violating municipal ordinances and to encourage them to come into compliance as 
soon as possible without having to resort to the more harsh penalties associated 
with the criminal law. They are not a regulatory fee or a fee for a service and do 
not, therefore, need to have any relation to whether a specific city service was 
provided or to the cost or lack of cost of such a service. 
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II. The Ability of Utah Cities to Collect Costs They Incur to Abate Nuisance 
Properties Does Not Bar Their Ability to Collect Civil Fines from 
Responsible Parties. 
Ogden City is entitled to assess civil penalties against Decker for his failure 
to maintain property within the city limits even though a state statute controls the 
conditions under which municipalities are allowed to recover abatement costs they 
incur on private property. Title 105 Chapter 11 of the Utah Code describes a 
detailed process by which cities are able to perform abatement work and then 
recover those costs either through litigation or through an assessment on the county 
tax rolls. Decker argues that this state law trumps the ability of Ogden City to 
assess civil penalties against those who are responsible for property where junk 
and debris has accumulated and that the city's "process in clear contradiction to the 
statute ought to be 'unconstitutional...."' Decker Brief, p. 24. The trial court ruled 
that the city could assess civil fines against a responsible person without 
conflicting with the state statute. 4 
4
 MR. HOMER: ... I believe [tjhere's some case law out there that talks about 
these types of situation[s] where ... municipal ordinances conflict with state law 
and Pd like to just kind of share those with the Court because I think that this 
whole idea, it can't conflict with state law and that's kind of my thing. So Pd like 
t o -
THE COURT: But, my ruling is I don't read it to conflict. So I guess my concern is 
that you're going to cite me cases that tells the Court what to do in the event of a 
conflict and I respect that -
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The Utah Supreme Court has said that "where a city ordinance is in conflict 
with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 
UT 29, f l5, 116 P.3d 290; see also Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (West 2004) 
(municipal legislative body may pass ordinances not repugnant to law for carrying 
into effect or discharging municipal powers and duties). "In determining whether 
an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance 
permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa. Id. 
(citation and quotations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently stated, 
however, that it "explicitly reject[s] the doctrine of implied conflict and hold[s] 
that an ordinance is not unconstitutional merely because it implicitly conflicts with 
a state statute." Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2006 UT 69,110, 148 P.3d 931. The 
Newman court then explained its holding as follows: 
Therefore, in the absence of express conflict, we will uphold a challenged 
ordinance unless there is some indication of incompatibility with the state 
statutory scheme. Implied conflict alone does not render an ordinance 
unconstitutional; impermissible conflict instead arises when provisions are 
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist. 
MR. HOMER: And you're not seeing the conflict. 
THE COURT: - but I don't see the conflict. I read the two statutes to work 
together. 
Trial Transcript, p. 75, lines 6-19. 
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Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In this case, Decker is essentially asking the 
Court to find that, when an owner of property refuses to take care of that property, 
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code limits the ability of municipalities to address 
weeds, garbage and nuisance objects or structures through any method other than 
the expenditure of municipal funds to perform the clean-up of such property. 
Although that chapter provides certain protections to landowners whose property is 
cleaned up at the expense of a municipality, it does not prohibit cities from 
imposing other sanctions when the owner fails to comply with property 
maintenance regulations. In addition, the scope of the finding which Decker 
proposes would not only frustrate municipal powers granted by the state 
legislature, but would seriously inhibit the operation of municipal government 
throughout the state. 
A. Ogden City's Civil Penalty Provisions Do Not Conflict With State Law. 
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code provides a detailed process with 
multiple forms of notice and opportunity to object when a municipality uses its 
own funds for the abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, or any unsightly or 
deleterious objects or structures, and then seeks to collect the costs of such 
abatement from the owner of the land. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-11-1, et. seq. 
(West 2004). In order to recover these costs, a city must appoint an inspector and 
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the inspector's duties shall include such things as: examining property for 
violations; sending specific notices of observed violations to the owner or occupant 
of the property; employing assistance to abate the violations if the owner or 
occupant has not done so within a reasonable time; preparing an itemized 
statement of the costs incurred and mail it to the property owner; and, if costs are 
to be collected through the county treasurer, providing certain notice of the costs to 
the county treasurer. Id. 5 
Decker fixates on the use of the word shall as it applies to the duties of a 
municipal inspector in the statutory collection process and then claims that because 
Ogden City did not clean up the property itself, it cannot hold him responsible for 
civil penalties when he did not comply with repeated notices that the property 
violated the city's property maintenance ordinance. In his argument, Decker does 
not explain how Ogden City's civil penalty provisions directly conflict with the 
state statute, nor does he acknowledge the context in which the inspector's 
mandatory duties are performed. 
/. Civil penalties complement the statutory method of collecting public 
abatement costs incurred on private property. 
5
 The Utah legislature changed portions of the statutory scheme in the 2011 
legislative session. Although those changes moved the process for an owner to 
obtain review of the actual costs incurred from the county to the city, the actions 
that the inspector is required to undertake as part of the abatement process did not 
substantially change. 
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The use of civil penalties does nothing to interfere with the provisions of 
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code. By placing the burden primarily on an 
owner or occupant to be responsible for the condition of property, the city saves 
both it and the responsible party both time and money. Those who are in charge of 
a piece of property are almost always in a better position to clean up junk, debris 
and address other maintenance violations than is a municipality. By placing the 
burden of maintenance on the owner or occupant, the city also better respects the 
property rights of those individuals. Civil penalties provide an incentive for the 
owner or occupant to respond to a situation where junk and debris needs to be 
removed from the property. None of these considerations conflict with the 
statutory process which a city uses to collect its costs when it decides to undertake 
the abatement process at its own cost. If a city ordinance authorized an inspector to 
proceed with abatement without notice of a violation or to recover costs incurred 
for abatement without providing a statement of the costs for the owner's review, 
there would be direct conflict with the statutory provisions. There is no conflict, 
however, when a city chooses not to spend its own dollars on abatement and assess 
civil, or even criminal, penalties on the responsible party when that person fails to 
act. The trial court agreed with this position. It said: 
I think Mr. Stratford, you indicated that the city chose to proceed by way of 
imposition of fines rather that abating the nuisance. I think Mr. Homer's 
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argument is well taken and well made that if the city had chosen to abate the 
nuisance, then it would have had to have complied with the provisions 
contained in 10-11-2,10-11-3 where I focused on the "shall" language and I 
think it's clear what the city is required to do in the event it decides to abate. 
But I think that [section] 10-8-60 provides the city with the option of doing 
one or both. It simply says the city may. It doesn't say shall. It doesn't say 
shall obey and shall impose fines. It says may abate and may impose fines, 
in this case based on the statutory reading, I'm going to find that the city's 
decision to proceed under this imposition of fines provision in 10-8-60 is not 
inconsistent with the abatement provisions contained in 10-11-1 and 11-2 
and 10-11-3 specifically. So on that limited basis, I'm going to deny the 
Motion to Dismiss. 
Trial Transcript, p. 68, line 12 through p. 69, line 4. 
Decker's claim is essentially one of implied conflict. The reasoning goes as 
follows: If the legislature established a detailed appointment, notice and hearing 
process for a city to collect the costs incurred by it as part of an abatement, then 
any other process adopted to address the issue of property maintenance must 
automatically be disallowed. This is like telling a carpenter that because he is given 
a new screwdriver, he can no longer use a hammer and nail. "When reviewing 
local government action, we give local government great latitude in creating 
solutions to the many challenges it faces, unless the action is arbitrary or is directly 
prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the policy of, the state or federal laws or the 
constitution of Utah or of the United States." Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem 
City, 2000 UT 26, \ 10, 995 P.2d 1237. The provisions of Title 10, Chapter 11, 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contain no preemptive language nor does it contain language denying preemption 
of alternative schemes for addressing property maintenance. 
ii. The context of the statutory collection method is consistent with the 
imposition and collection of civil penalties 
Tellingly, Decker does not identify for this Court how the imposition of civil 
penalties in the form of fines creates a direct conflict with the statutory scheme for 
collecting costs incurred for abatement. In his brief, Decker basically argues that 
because the legislature has enacted a statute providing how cities can recoup 
expenses incurred in abating nuisances on private property, it must therefore be a 
direct conflict - and a violation of his due process rights - for a city to "attempt to 
impose and collect 'civil penalties' in excess of the amounts prescribed by 
controlling statute (which says [sic], essentially, $0)..." Decker Brief, pp. 26-27.6 
It is apparently Decker's belief, or at least the logical extension of his argument, 
that property owners and those responsible for maintaining property essentially get 
a free pass to ignore property maintenance standards unless the city takes 
affirmative action, at the public expense, to clean up junk, debris and other 
nuisance conditions on the property. 
6
 This due process argument was not made to the trial court and cannot, therefore, 
be raised for the first time on appeal. Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT 
App 239, 8 P.3d 281,288. Ogden City is not here responding to the due process 
allegation raised in the brief, but to the separate issue of whether its assessment of 
civil penalties is a valid exercise of its municipal power. 
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In this context, it may be helpful to look at the structure of the cost recovery 
statute. The inspector is given a number of duties which appear to be mandatory. 
The duty with the most significance to Decker's argument is that "the inspector 
shall... at the expense of the municipality, employ necessary assistance and cause 
the weeds, garbage, refuse, objects, or structures to be removed or destroyed ...." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-11-3 (West Supp. 2010). Decker seizes on this mandatory 
language and criticizes Ogden City for not complying with the statute and 
'"crank[ing] out' the citation letters." Decker Brief, p. 24. Although the word 
"shall is generally presumed to indicate a mandatory requirement, ... on occasion, 
it has also been interpreted as merely directory. Factors to be considered in this 
determination include whether the provision affects substantial rights and whether 
the provision is necessary to effectuate the intent of the statute." Southwick v. 
Southwick, 2011 UT App 222,113 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The intent of the statute, in this case, is to guarantee that an owner does not 
have to pay for abatement costs incurred by a city without having first been given 
an opportunity to make the correction or to review the costs incurred for errors and 
file a challenge requiring review of such costs. Thus, in order to collect its costs, 
the city must incur costs and the inspector's duties are mandatory. These 
mandatory duties protect the property owner from having to pay costs that were 
incurred without prior notice. But in carrying out the overall objective of 
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remediating junk and debris throughout the city, it makes no sense for the inspector 
to be required to incur costs to clean up every property on which junk and debris is 
observed. Compare, Price Development, 2000 UT 26, at f 15 (city's plan to sustain 
sales tax base did not conflict with objectives of state development act). 
In the final analysis, the fundamental question that must be answered in 
determining if the imposition of civil penalties for failing to maintain one's 
property is unconstitutional is whether the civil penalties cannot coexist with the 
process established by the legislature allowing municipalities to collect costs 
incurred for abatement. Regardless of Decker's efforts to contrast the "non-existent 
expenses (of clean-up) the CITY did not incur" with "[t]he CITY's attempt to 
collect the '$500 per letter' fee," the answer to this question, as explained above, is 
that the two processes can easily coexist. Decker Brief, p. 26. What is non-existent, 
however, is any evidence of legislative intent to supplant municipal powers to 
assess civil penalties merely because it created a method by which cities could 
recover expenses incurred in abating nuisance properties. 
B. Decker's Interpretation of Title 10 Chapter 11 of the Utah Code Would 
Negate Powers Exclusively Recognized Elsewhere in the Utah Code 
Decker's argument that municipalities cannot collect civil penalties in the 
way of fines from responsible persons is further eroded when other parts of the 
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municipal code are taken into consideration. The power to address nuisances is not 
given to municipalities by title 10, chapter 11 of the Utah Code. This power is 
actually recognized in section 10-8-60, where it is recognized that cities "may 
declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines upon 
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-60 (West 2004). If, as Decker asserts, Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code 
limits cities9 powers to only using municipal funds for abatement of garbage, 
refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or structures and then seeking 
reimbursement of those costs, what happens to cities express power to impose fines 
on those persons who suffer nuisances to exist? Whatever support Decker5 s 
argument may have is further eroded when the statute allowing cities to regulate '.; 
nuisances is compared with the other enumerated powers of cities. 
Most of the areas in which the legislature has specifically authorized cities to 
act do not include specific language dealing with penalties. For these recognized 
powers, section 10-8-84 provides blanket authority to "enforce obedience to the 
ordinances with fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703." But in the 
case of nuisances, the grant of power specifically authorizes the assessment of 
fines as one method of dealing with the problem. As a result, Decker cannot simply 
argue that the ability of Ogden City to collect a fine is trumped by the provisions of 
Title 10, Chapter 11. Such a reading would require this Court to expressly 
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determine that the result of one statute is to directly cause a separate statute to 
become inoperable. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force 
and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict 
with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid 
conflicts. 
Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991). The trial judge correctly 
applied this rule when he heard arguments in this case and concluded: 
My reading of 10-8-60 is not inconsistent with what's contained in 10-11-1 
and 10-11-2 and 10-11-3.... My understanding is that we're to read statutes 
in a way that makes sense when we're trying to take two different statutory 
provisions and work them together. The reading should be a reading that 
gives effect to both statutes and in this case, the way I read it is exactly as I 
tried to articulate the first time, and that is, that under 10-8-60 the 
municipality may declare what shall be a nuisance and may abate the same 
and may impose fines upon person who may create, continue or suffer 
nuisances to exist. 
Trial Transcript, p. 67, line 25 through p. 68, line 11. 
Decker has not provided a satisfactory explanation of how these two statutes 
can be harmonized under his theory of the case. During argument before the trial 
court, Decker offered an opinion that perhaps nuisances should be classified into 
two groups: those that are subject to recovery of costs under title 10, chapter 11, 
and those that are not. See Trial Transcript, p. 62, line 9 through p. 64, line 9. The 
fundamental problem with Decker's tiered approach, i.e., that some nuisances are 
worthy of fines and others just have to be suffered until the city finds the time and 
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money to remove them, is that there is no evidence that the legislature intended for 
the statutes to be read in this way. 
When title 10, chapter 11 was adopted, the legislature could have clarified 
the general municipal power specifically allowing assessing fines for nuisances 
and exempted specifically identified types of nuisances from the assessment of a 
fine. It did not do so. As a result, the courts should not create a tiered nuisance 
system when the legislature did not provide any indication that such a system was 
intended. Instead, the more straightforward and acceptable interpretation is that the 
legislature allows cities to abate nuisances and to impose fines for all nuisances -
but when a municipality uses its own funds to complete the abatement, it has 
additional avenues to recover its reasonably incurred costs, but only by complying 
with the terms of title 10, chapter 11. 
C. Significant Public Policy Values Would Be Compromised if Decker's 
Suggestion is Adopted That Title 10 Chapter 11 Prohibits Cities From 
Assessing Civil Penalties for Nuisance Properties 
There are a number of other significant problems with Decker's analysis that 
a city can only choose to deal with certain property maintenance violations through 
publicly funded abatement rather than by civil penalties. A few of the most 
obvious will be briefly identified. 
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First, the cost to local government would be unbearable. Cities have a finite 
amount of resources that can be devoted to abating weeds, garbage, refuse and 
unsightly and deleterious objects and structures. Even though a city is entitled to 
recover costs incurred for abatement, it is simply unrealistic to believe that a city 
can bear the time and expense associated with every property on which one of 
these conditions may be found. 
Second, cities would be stripped of their ability to encourage appropriate 
action through the use of criminal penalties. In addition to civil penalties, cities can 
enforce obedience to municipal ordinances through the criminal law. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-703 (West 2004). If Decker is correct, that Title 10, Chapter 11, is the 
exclusive method by which a city may address property maintenance violations, 
then it would follow that criminal penalties are also inapplicable. On the other 
hand, if civil fines are not allowed, but criminal penalties are allowed, the 
legislature would have created an awkward incentive for cities to file criminal 
charges against responsible parties who do not respond to warnings that property 
needs to be cleaned up. 
Third, Decker's reading would lead to decreased compliance with local 
ordinances. If a potentially responsible person knows that civil penalties may be 
assessed, they are more likely to respond to a notice of violation voluntarily. If the 
city's civil recourse is capped at the cost of abatement, the person can choose to 
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simply wait the city out and know that eventually, if the city ever comes in and 
cleans the property up, they will only have to pay the actual costs of the cleanup. 
Such an approach would lead to less orderly rather than more orderly communities. 
Finally, Decker's argument could easily lead to significant risk to public 
health and welfare. Much of the reason that weeds, garbage and refuse need to be 
controlled has nothing to do with aesthetics. Instead, it is directly related to 
controlling the spread of noxious weeds and limiting the ability of rodents to 
multiply and spread disease. Where a city does not have the resources to abate all 
violations, and where responsible parties would be given an incentive to delay or 
completely ignore the process of removing the offending items, the risk to public 
health would be increased. For all of these reasons, it would be unjustified to 
assume that the legislature intended to limit the powers of cities to control 
nuisances through civil penalties when it adopted Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah 
Code as a method of allowing the collection of the actual cost of an abatement 
where city funds are expended. 
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CONCLUSION 
Decker is a responsible party against whom civil fines were assessed as 
allowed by state law and implemented under local ordinance. The process utilized 
by the city did not deprive Decker of due process of law and is consistent with 
legislative enactments encouraging the proper maintenance of lands located within 
cities. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that Ogden City's civil 
enforcement process does not result in constitutional violations and the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^  day of August, 2011. 
MARKH. Sr 
Attorney for Ogden City 
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ADDENDUM 
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 1, Chapter 4A (General Penalties) 
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 1, Chapter 4B (Code Violations and Penalties) 
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 12, Chapter 4 (Property Maintenance 
Regulations) 
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1-4A-1 1-4A-1 
CHAPTER 4 
CODE VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 










Application Of Chapter 
Applicability Of State Law 
Prosecutions 
Prosecutorial Discretion To Reduce Penalty 
1-4A-1: PENALTIES: 
A. General Penalty: Any person convicted of violating any provision of 
the ordinances codified in this code, or ordinances hereafter 
enacted, shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor unless otherwise 
specified in such ordinance or interpreted by the court as a class C 
misdemeanor or infraction, and such violations shall be punished as 
follows: 
1. For any person, other than a corporation, association, partnership, 
or governmental instrumentality, convicted of an offense: 
a. In the case of a class B misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum 
not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment 
for a term not longer than six (6) months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment; 
b. In the case of a class C misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum 
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding ninety (90) days, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment; and 
1. Prior ordinance history: 1999 Code; Ord. 2005-27, 5-24-2005. 
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1-4A-1 1-4A-1 
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c. In the case of an infraction, by a fine in any sum not 
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00). 
2. For a corporation, association, partnership, or governmental 
instrumentality convicted of an offense: 
a. For a class B misdemeanor shall be in an amount not 
exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000.00); and 
b. For a class C misdemeanor or an infraction shall be an 
amount not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). 
B. Civil Penalties: 
1. In addition to the penalties provided above, a court upon 
conviction may sentence a person convicted of an offense, other 
than a violation of title 10 of this code, to a civil penalty in the 
following amounts: 
a. For any violation where the city provided prior notice of such 
violation and the person failed to comply with such notice, a civil 
penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00). 
b. For any violation of title 11, "Police Regulations", of this code 
where the person was convicted of the same offense within the last 
two (2) years, or where the person was convicted of a felony within 
the last four (4) years, a civil penalty in the following amounts: 
Class B misdemeanor $200.00 
Class C misdemeanor/infraction 100.00 
c. For a violation of title 13, "Animals", of this code where the 
person was convicted of the same offense within the last two (2) 
years, a civil penalty in the following amounts for the following 
violations: 
(1) Roaming dog violation or otherwise failing to keep a dog 
from running at large in violation of section 13-2-6 of this 
code, a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred dollars 
($100.00); or 
(2) Barking dog violation or otherwise maintaining a public 
nuisance in violation of subsection 13-2-7A4 of this code, a 
civil penalty in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00). 
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1-4A-1 1-4A-1 
(3) Maintaining a public nuisance determined to be a 
dangerous dog or vicious animal in violation of subsection 
13-2-7A6 or A7 of this code, a civil penalty in the amount of 
five hundred dollars ($500.00). 
d. For a violation of title 12, chapter 14, "Noise", of this code 
where the person was convicted of the same offense within the last 
two (2) years, a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred fifty 
dollars ($150.00). 
2. In no event shall a civil penalty when combined with any fine 
imposed by the court exceed the maximum fine that may be imposed 
for such offense, and such civil penalty shall be reduced accordingly. 
3. No more than one civil penalty shall be imposed under this code 
for any single criminal episode, and the highest applicable civil 
penalty shall apply. 
4. Civil penalties imposed under this section may be satisfied 
through the performance of community service with the city at a rate 
equal to the minimum wage. 
5. The city, at its own option, may pursue independent collection of 
such civil penalties in the civil courts if not collected by the court 
having jurisdiction over the criminal offense. 
C. Costs: The court may also require a convicted defendant to pay 
costs as provided in sections 77-32a-1 through 77-32a-14, Utah 
Code Annotated or its successor provisions. 
D. Restitution: The court may also require a convicted defendant to 
make restitution as provided in the crime victims restitution act, 
chapter 38a, title 77, Utah Code Annotated, or its successor 
provisions, which order may include costs incurred by the city in 
abating a public nuisance related to the offense for which the 
defendant is responsible. 
E. Prosecution Of Individual Not Precluded: A prosecution of, or civil 
action against, a corporation, association or partnership, as an 
entity, shall not preclude prosecutions of, or civil actions against, 
individuals responsible for the action of such entities and shall not 
preclude a separate fine, civil penalty or imprisonment or 
combination thereof for those individuals, as well as a separate fine 
or civil penalty for the business entity. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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A. Employers And Agents: When the provisions of this code prohibit the 
commission or omission of an act, not only the person actually doing 
the prohibited thing or omitting the directed act, but also the 
employer and all other persons concerned or aiding or abetting 
therein shall be guilty of the offense or violation described and liable 
for the penalties prescribed for the offense or violation. 
B. City Officers And Employees: No provision of this code designating 
the duties of any officer or employee shall be so construed as to 
make such officer or employee liable for any fine or penalty provided 
for a failure to perform such duty, unless the intention of the city 
council to impose such fine or penalty on such officer or employee is 
specifically and clearly expressed in the section creating the duty. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4A-3: APPLICATION OF CHAPTER: 
A. No Specific Penalty Declared: Whenever the doing of any act or the 
omission to do any act constitutes a breach of any section or 
provision of this code and there shall be no fine or penalty 
specifically declared for such breach, the provisions of this article 
shall apply. 
B. Continued Violation: In all instances where the violation of this code 
is a continuing violation, a separate offense shall be deemed 
committed upon each day during or on which the offense occurs or 
continues. 
C. Offense Under Different Sections: In all cases where the same 
offense is made punishable or is created by different clauses or 
sections of this code, the prosecuting attorney may elect under 
which to proceed; but not more than one recovery shall be had 
against the same person for the same offense; provided, that the 
revocation of a license or permit shall not be considered a recovery 
or penalty so as to bar any other penalty being enforced. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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1-4A-4 1-4A-6 
1-4A-4: APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW: 
A. Utah Code Of Criminal Procedure: Except as otherwise provided in 
this article, the procedure in all criminal cases arising under this 
article shall be as prescribed in Utah Code Annotated title 77, Utah 
code of criminal procedure, which is hereby incorporated and 
adopted herein by reference. Any other applicable rules adopted by 
the Utah supreme court also are hereby incorporated and adopted 
herein by reference. 
B. Utah Criminal Code: Utah Code Annotated title 76, the Utah criminal 
code, chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, relating to principles of construction, 
jurisdiction, venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecutions, 
double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions, principles of criminal 
responsibility, punishments, and inchoate offenses apply to any 
criminal offense defined in this code, except as otherwise impractical 
or inappropriate in view of the context of purposes or penalties 
provided. 
C. Arrest And Summons: Except as otherwise provided in this article, all 
arrests of persons for any violation of this code shall be made in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated title 77, chapter 7, Utah code 
of criminal procedures, and rules 6 and 7, Utah rules of criminal 
procedures. All summons in lieu of warrants of arrest shall be in 
accordance with rule 6, Utah rules of criminal procedures. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4A-5: PROSECUTIONS: 
A. All prosecutions for violations of this code shall be in the name of 
Ogden City. 
B. Prosecutions for violations of this code shall be commenced by the 
filing of an information with any court having jurisdiction. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4A-6: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO REDUCE PENALTY: 
The prosecutor shall have the authority to reduce the penalty 
of an offense under the provisions of this code if the reduction in the 
penalty will serve the interests of justice. In making such a determination, 
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( 
the prosecutor may consider the nature of the alleged offense, the 
circumstances under which the allegations arose and the resources being 
brought to bear in the prosecution of the offense. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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1-4B-1 1-4B-2 
CHAPTER 4 
CODE VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 
ARTICLE B. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPOSITION 














Purpose; Applicability Of Article 
Definitions 
Notice Of Violation 





Extensions Of Time 
Appeals 
Collection 
Collection Action Not Relief Of Correction Responsibility 
1-4B-1: PURPOSE; APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE: The purpose of 
this article is to provide a standardized procedure for the 
administrative imposition of certain civil penalties authorized under various 
sections, articles, chapters or titles of this code and to encourage the 
correction of code violation without resort to the criminal courts. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-2: DEFINITIONS: The following terms shall be defined as 
indicated for the purposes of this article: 
CIVIL CITATION (Also 
Known As A 
CITATION): 
A written notice, issued by an enforcement 
officer to a responsible party, that a violation of 
this code has occurred and that a civil penalty 
has been assessed. 
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1-4B-2 1-4B-2 
DATE OF NOTICE: A. The date of personal delivery of any notice or 
civil citation to the responsible party; or 
B. Five (5) days after any notice or civil citation 







Known As A 
NOTICE, NOTICE OF 
CODE VIOLATION, 
NOTICE AND ORDER 
OR WARNING NOTICE): 
PERSONAL DELIVERY: 
1. Owner of the real property that is the 
subject of the notice or citation at the last 
known address as shown on the records of the 
Weber County assessor, as evidenced in the 
records maintained in the Weber County 
recorder's office, 
2. Occupant of the real property that is the 
subject of the notice or citation at the address of 
the property in violation, unless another address 
for such occupant is shown on the records of 
the Weber County assessor's office, as 
evidenced in the records maintained in the 
Weber County recorder's office; or 
C. The date that a notice or civil citation is 
affixed to a vehicle found in violation or mailed 
via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
registered owner of such vehicle at the address 
as shown in the registration records of the state 
of Utah. 
An officer, employee or other person authorized 
to issue any notice of violation or civil citation. 
The mayor, or any hearing officer designated by 
the mayor. 
A written notice, issued by an enforcement 
officer to a responsible party, that a violation of 
this code has occurred. 
Hand delivery to the responsible party, or 
leaving it at the responsible party's dwelling 
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1-4B-2 1-4B-5 
house or usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion then 
residing therein. 
RESPONSIBLE PARTY: Any person liable for a violation or civil penalty 
under the applicable provisions of this code. 
WARNING PERIOD: Ten (10) days after the date of notice, unless a 
greater period of time is given by the enforce-
ment officer. If the notice of violation is 
delivered by first class mail, the time for 
correction listed in such notice shall include the 
additional five (5) days required for delivery. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-3: NOTICE OF VIOLATION: If an enforcement officer finds that 
a violation exists within the city, the enforcement officer may 
provide a notice of violation to the responsible party. The notice of violation 
shall indicate the nature of the violation, the action necessary to correct it, 
the warning period established before imposition of civil penalties, and the 
civil penalty amount for failure to correct the violation within the established 
warning period. The date of notice applicable to such notice shall serve to 
start the warning period. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-4: FAILURE TO COMPLY: If a violation within the city remains 
uncorrected after expiration of the warning period, the 
responsible party shall be liable for the civil penalties imposed under such 
title, chapter, article or section of this code. Such penalty shall be assessed 
by issuance of a citation by the enforcement officer. Any penalty assessed 
herein shall be in addition to such other penalties as may be provided in 
this code. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-5: DAILY VIOLATIONS: Each day a violation remains 
uncorrected after expiration of the warning period and upon 
any subsequent issuance of a civil citation shall give rise to a separate civil 
penalty. The city may combine any action to recover daily penalties with 
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any other civil penalty regarding the same property or person. No civil 
citation shall issue for a daily violation that occurs in conjunction with 
another criminal violation as part of a single criminal episode that will be 
prosecuted in a criminal proceeding. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-6: REOCCURRING VIOLATIONS: If a violation is corrected but 
reoccurs on or related to the same property within two (2) 
years following the imposition of any civil penalty and the violation is 
committed by the same person, any subsequent violation after expiration of 
a new warning period shall subject that person to the applicable maximum 
penalty. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-7: MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS: If a notice of violation describes 
more than one violation on or related to the same property, 
only the highest civil penalty shall be applicable for the daily violations. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-8: PAYMENT: Any person issued a civil citation shall within 
twenty (20) days of the date of notice pay the civil penalty, 
unless a written request for a hearing is filed pursuant to section 1-4B-10 of 
this article. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-9: EXTENSIONS OF TIME: 
A. Upon receipt of a written application from any person who may be 
subject to future civil penalties under the provisions of this article 
and by agreement of such person to comply with the notice if 
allowed additional time, the enforcement officer may grant an 
extended warning period, if the officer determines that good cause 
exists for such extended warning period and the extension will not 
seriously threaten the effective enforcement of the applicable title, 
chapter, article or section of this code, nor pose an imminent danger 
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1-4B-9 1-4B-10 
to the public health, safety or welfare. The mayor may adopt written 
guidelines for the granting of extensions under this section. 
B. The granting of an extension shall not restrict the power of the 
building official to require vacation of premises, nor restrict the 
enforcement of other code violations. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-10: APPEALS: 
A. Request; Application: Any person having received a notice of 
violation or a civil citation may request a hearing before a hearing 
officer by filing a written application for a hearing in the city 
recorder's office within ten (10) days of the date of notice. Hearings 
shall be conducted as provided in title 4, chapter 4, article A of this 
code. All applications for hearing shall be accompanied by a copy of 
the notice of violation and the fee established in section 4-6-1 of this 
code. 
B. Notification Of Enforcement Officer: Upon receipt of an application 
for hearing, the city recorder shall immediately notify the 
enforcement officer. 
C. Burden Of Proof: The burden to prove any defense shall be upon the 
person raising such defense. 
D. Applicable Defenses: The hearing officer may dismiss the notice and 
release the person from liability, if any of the following defenses are 
applicable: 
1. Notice was not served in compliance with the provisions of this 
article; 
2. The violation was corrected within the warning period; 
3. It is determined that no violation of the ordinance existed under 
the notice or civil citation; or 
4. At the time of the notice or civil citation, compliance would have 
violated the criminal laws of the state. 
E. Mitigating Circumstances: If the hearing officer finds that a violation 
did occur but that mitigating circumstances exist, the penalty may be 
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reduced after the violation is corrected. Mitigating circumstances 
may include: 
1. If a change in the actual ownership of the subject property was 
recorded with the county recorder's office after the notice of violation 
was issued and the new owner is not related by blood, marriage or 
common ownership to the prior owner; 
2. If the violation or inability to cure were caused by a force majeure 
event such as war, act of nature, strike or civil disturbance; 
3. Compliance with the notice would have presented an imminent 
and irreparable injury to persons or property; or 
4. Such other mitigating circumstances as may be approved by the 
city attorney or the responsible official. 
F. Correction After Expiration Of Warning Period Not Defense: It shall 
not be a defense that the responsible party corrected the violation 
after expiration of the warning period. 
G. Agreement For Delayed Or Periodic Payments: If the hearing officer 
finds that the violation occurred and no applicable defense applies, 
the hearing officer may, in the interest of justice and on behalf of the 
city, enter into an agreement for the delayed or periodic payment of 
the applicable penalties. In the absence of an agreement for delayed 
or periodic payments, any civil penalty upheld or reduced by the 
hearing officer shall be paid within twenty (20) days of the date of 
the hearing officer's written decision. 
H. Appeal To Board Of Building And Fire Code Appeals Or Board Of 
Zoning Adjustment: Any administrative determination by the hearing 
officer regarding an interpretation of the provisions of this code 
within the jurisdiction of either the board of building and fire code 
appeals or the board of zoning adjustment may be appealed to the 
applicable board. 
I. Appeal To District Court: Any person adversely affected by the 
decision of the hearing officer may petition the district court for 
review of the administrative determination pursuant to section 
10-3-703.7(5), Utah Code Annotated, or its successor provision. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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1-4B-11: COLLECTION: If a civil penalty imposed pursuant to this 
article remains unpaid, the city may use such lawful means as 
are available to collect such penalty, including costs and attorney fees. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
1-4B-12: COLLECTION ACTION NOT RELIEF OF CORRECTION 
RESPONSIBILITY: Commencement of any collection action 
shall not relieve the responsibility of any person to cure any violation, if still 
uncorrected. 
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE REGULATIONS 
SECTION: 
12-4-1: Property Maintenance Responsibilities; Sidewalks, Park Strips 
And Abutter's Alleys 
12-4-2: Waste Materials Or Junk; Prohibited On Premises 
12-4-3: Weed Control 
12-4-4: Noxious Weeds 
12-4-5: Vegetation Interfering With Public Ways Or Property 
12-4-6: Empty Buildings To Be Kept Secured 
12-4-7: Inspectors Authorized To Enforce Chapter 
12-4-8: Penalties And Remedies For Violations 
12-4-1: PROPERTY MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES; SIDE-
WALKS, PARK STRIPS AND ABUTTER'S ALLEYS: 
A. It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real 
property to keep their exterior property free of conditions which 
violate the provisions of this chapter. 
B. It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real 
property abutting and bordering on any public street in the city to 
keep the area between their property line and the curb or edge of the 
roadway free of conditions which violate the provisions of this 
chapter. Such area shall include sidewalks, park strips between 
streets and sidewalks, or other adjacent landscaped or open areas 
within a dedicated public right of way. 
C. It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real 
property which faces on an abutter's alley to keep that portion of the 
alley which is adjacent to such property, free of conditions which 
violate the provisions of this chapter. If the alley was dedicated for 
the benefit of real property on both sides of the alley, the duty shall 
extend to the centerline of the alley. If the alley was dedicated only 
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12-4-1 12-4-2 
for the benefit of real property along one side of the alley, the duty 
shall extend for the entire width. 
(1979 Code § 8.26.010; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997) 
12-4-2: WASTE MATERIALS OR JUNK; PROHIBITED ON PREM-
ISES: 
A. Prohibition: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of 
real property within the city, to allow, cause or permit the following 
material or objects to be in or upon any yard, garden, lawn, or 
outdoor premises of such property: 
1. Junk or salvage material; 
2. Litter; 
3. Any abandoned vehicle or inoperable vehicle. 
B. Exceptions: The prohibition in subsection A of this section shall not 
apply to: 
1. Materials or objects used, kept or maintained in connection with a 
business enterprise lawfully situated and licensed for the same and 
operating in conformance with the zoning title or other provisions of 
this code; or 
2. The outdoor storage of no more than one vehicle at a residence, 
as described in subsection G in the definition of "junk or salvage 
yard", section 15-2-11 of this code. 
C. Prohibition On Park Strips, Sidewalks, Etc.: It is unlawful for any 
owner, occupant, agent or lessee of real property abutting and 
bordering on any public street in the city, for the distance such real 
property abuts and borders such street, to allow, cause or permit 
litter, or junk or salvage material, to be in or upon the area from the 
property line to the curb line of the street or edge of the roadway. 
D. Abutter's Alleys: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or 
lessee of real property facing on any abutter's alley, to allow, cause 
or permit litter or junk or salvage material to be in or upon that 
portion of the abutter's alley for which the owner, occupant, agent or 
June 2011 
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i 
lessee is responsible as provided under subsection 12-4-1C of this 
chapter. 
(1979 Code § 8.26.020; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. 1999 Code) 
12-4-3: WEED CONTROL: 
A. Premises: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of 
real property in the city to fail to maintain the height of weeds and 
grasses, in the manner provided herein, on such property, or to fail 
to remove from the property any cuttings from such weeds or 
grasses. 
B. Park Strips: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of 
real property in the city abutting and bordering on any public street, 
for the distance such property abuts and borders the street, to fail to 
maintain the height of weeds and grasses, in the manner provided 
herein, in the area from the property line to the curb line of the 
street, or to fail to remove from such area any cuttings from such 
weeds or grasses. 
C. Abutter's Alleys: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or 
lessee of real property in the city which faces on an abutter's alley 
for the distance such property abuts and borders, to fail to maintain 
the height of weeds and grasses, in the manner provided herein, in 
that portion of the abutter's alley for which the owner, occupant, 
agent or lessee is responsible as provided under section 12-4-1 of 
this chapter. 
D. Weed Control Specifications: 
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection D2 of this section, 
weeds and grasses shall be maintained at a height of not more than 
six inches (6") at all times, and the cuttings shall be promptly cleared 
and removed from the premises; provided, however, that this 
subsection shall not be applicable to any ornamental grass so long 
as it is used and maintained solely, or in combination with any other 
ornamental grass or grasses, as a supplement to an overall 
landscaping plan and does not constitute in square footage more 
than twenty percent (20%) of the property's overall landscaped area. 
2. Weeds and grasses shall be maintained at a height of not more 
than twelve inches (12") at all times on any of the following 
properties, and the cuttings shall be promptly cleared and removed 
from the premises: 
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a. Areas zoned as open space zone (0-1) pursuant to title 15 of 
this code; 
b. Ditches, ditch rights of way or railroad rights of way; and 
c. Undeveloped property or vacant lots (no buildings or 
structures). 
3. Weeds which are eradicated by chemicals must be done so before 
their height exceeds the height limits provided herein, or they must 
be cut at a level not exceeding such height limits. 
4. Weeds which are rototilled or removed by the root must be buried 
under the soil or removed from the property. 
5. When, in the opinion of the fire marshal, or any assistant fire 
marshal, the large size or terrain of property makes the cutting of all 
weeds or grasses impractical, the fire marshal, or any assistant fire 
marshal, may, by written order, allow and limit the required cutting of 
weeds and grasses to a firebreak of not less than fifteen feet (15') in 
width cut around the complete perimeter of the property and around 
any structures existing upon the property, unless the fire marshal, or 
assistant fire marshal, determines that a firebreak of a lesser width 
will provide adequate protection against fire spread at the particular 
location. 
6. The fire marshal may from time to time exempt from, or limit, in 
whole or in part, the required cutting of weeds and grasses for 
property established and maintained as a nature park or wetland 
mitigation area, if the fire marshal, or assistant fire marshal, 
determines that such limitation or exemption will not present a 
potential fire hazard to adjacent properties. 
(1979 Code §8.26.030; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2002-73, 
12-17-2002) 
12-4-4: NOXIOUS WEEDS: It shall be unlawful for the owner or 
occupant of any real property to allow to grow on such 
property any noxious weeds or other noxious vegetable growth determined 
by the county health department to be especially injurious to public health, 
crops, livestock, land, or other property. 
(1979 Code § 8.26.040; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997) 
October 2003 
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12-4-5: VEGETATION INTERFERING WITH PUBLIC WAYS OR 
PROPERTY: It shall be unlawful for the owner or occupant of 
any real property to allow vegetation on the owner's or occupant's real 
property to grow to such an extent or in such a manner that, because of its 
proximity to public property or a public right of way, it interferes with the 
safe or lawful use of public property or the public right of way, or obstructs 
the vision of any posted uniform traffic control device. 
(1979 Code § 8.26.050; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997) 
12-4-6: EMPTY BUILDINGS TO BE KEPT SECURED: It shall be 
unlawful for the owners or agents or persons in charge of 
unoccupied buildings or structures within the city to fail to keep such 
buildings and structures closed and securely locked or otherwise secured 
against entry. 
(1979 Code § 8.26.060; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997) 
12-4-7: INSPECTORS AUTHORIZED TO ENFORCE CHAPTER: 
A. Appointment By Mayor: The mayor shall appoint inspectors who are 
authorized to enforce the provisions of this chapter. 
B. Powers And Duties: 
1. An inspector is authorized and directed to inspect and examine 
real property situated within the city for the purpose of determining 
whether or not a property maintenance violation exists. 
2. All matters involving health shall be pursued in coordination with 
the county health department. All matters involving weeds or other 
fire hazards shall be pursued in coordination with the fire 
department. All matters involving the boarding of dangerous 
buildings shall be pursued in coordination with the building official. 
All matters involving the lawful use of land under the zoning title 
shall be pursued in coordination with the community and economic 
development director, or the director's designee. 
3. The mayor may assign primary responsibility in those areas of 
overlapping jurisdiction. 
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(1979 Code §8.26.080; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2001-32, 
6-5-2001; Ord. 2004-39, 6-15-2004, eff. 7-1-2004) 
12-4-8: PENALTIES AND REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS: 
A. Misdemeanor: Owners, agents, occupants or lessees who violate the 
provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
and upon conviction shall be punishable as set forth in title 1, 
chapter 4, article A of this code. 
B. City Abatement And Associated Civil Penalties: Litter or other 
unlawful accumulations or conditions not removed from private 
property, or adjacent sidewalks, park strips, alleys, or other adjacent 
areas for which the person is responsible under the provisions of this 
chapter, may be removed by the city pursuant to the provisions of 
chapter 8 of this title, or its successor, with costs and expenses for 
such cleaning or removal and civil penalties to be assessed in 
accordance with the provisions of such chapter. 
C. Civil Penalties: Owners, agents, occupants or lessees who fail to 
correct a violation of the provisions of this chapter after notice of 
violation and expiration of the warning period shall be subject to the 
following civil penalties pursuant to title 1, chapter 4, article B of this 
code: 
1. The first civil citation issued after expiration of the warning period 
shall subject the responsible party to the initial penalty of one 
hundred twenty five dollars ($125.00). 
2. The second civil citation issued after expiration of the warning 
period and the prior imposition of the initial penalty shall subject the 
responsible party to the intermediate penalty of two hundred fifty 
dollars ($250.00). 
3. Any subsequent civil citation issued after expiration of the warning 
period and the prior imposition of the intermediate penalty, or any 
reoccurring violation under section 1-4B-6 of this code, shall subject 
the responsible party to the maximum penalty of five hundred dollars 
($500.00). 
D. Other Remedies: This chapter may also be enforced by injunction, 
mandamus, judicial abatement or any other appropriate action in law 
or equity. 
September 2005 
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E. Daily Violations: Each day that any violation of this chapter continues 
shall be considered a separate offense for purposes of the penalties 
and remedies available to the city. 
F. Compliance: Accumulation of penalties for violations, but not the 
obligation for payment of penalties already accrued, shall stop on 
correction of the violation. 
G. Cumulative: Any one, all, or any combination of the foregoing 
penalties and remedies may be used to enforce the provisions of this 
title. 
(1979 Code §8.26.070; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2002-73, 
12-17-2002; Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005) 
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